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JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-610(4) allows a member who is aggrieved by a decision of the Utah 
State Retirement Board ("Board") to obtain judicial review by complying with the procedures and 
requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, the Administrative Procedures Act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court or other appellate 
court designated by statute to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
hearings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure confer 
jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of the state. 
STATEMENT QF ISSUES PRESENTED FQR REVIEW 
(1) Were the Adjudicative Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, including 
his conclusions from the Stipulated Facts, supported by substantial evidence? 
(2) Was the Board's interpretation of the term "overtime" erroneous? 
(3) Did the Board's interpretation of "overtime" interfere with O'Keefe's employment 
relationship with Ogden City? 
(4) May O'Keefe invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the Board under 
circumstances where he was aware of the conditional nature of the Board's earlier representations 
and failed to present any evidence on detrimental reliance or injury suffered from the Board's 
representation. 
I 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
O'Keefe may only be granted relief if, on the basis of the factual record, the court determines 
that he has been prejudiced by Board action that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
The Appellate Court does not conduct a de novo credibility determination or reweigh the 
evidence. Ouestar Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm'a 850 P.2d 1175,1178 (Utah 1993), nor will an 
agency's findings of fact be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion 
from the evidence is permissible Hurley v. Board of Review of Industrial Comm'n. 767 P.2d 524, 
526-527 (Utah 1988). It is the province of the agency, not the Appellate Court, to resolve conflicting 
evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the 
agency to draw the inference. Albertsons Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security. 854 P. 2d 570, 575 
(Utah App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-203(1) (j), (g) and (1), the Board shall: 
(j) develop broad policy for the long-term operation 
of the various retirement systems, plans, and programs 
and is granted broad discretion and power to perform 
m policymaking fyinctiQps; 
(g) maintain, in conjunction with participating 
employers and members, the systems, plans, and 
programs on an actuarially sound or approved basis, 
subject to the responsibility of the Legislature to 
adjust benefits and contribution rates when 
recommended by the board; 
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(1) regulate the duties of employing units and other 
public authorities which are imposed upon them by 
this title and specify the time, place, and manner in 
which contributions shall be withheld and paid, and 
obtain any reports necessary for the administration of 
this title, (emph. added) 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-102(1): 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a retirement 
system for public safety employees which provides 
the following: 
(1) a uniform system of membership; 
(2) retirement requirements; 
(3) benefits for public safety employees; 
(4) funding on an actuarially sound basis; 
(5) contributions by employers and employees; and 
(6) economy and efficiency in public service, (emph. 
added) 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-103(1): 
(a) "Compensation," "salary," or "wages" means the 
total amount of payments which are currently 
includable in gross income made by an employer to an 
employee covered under the retirement system for 
services rendered to the employer as base income. 
Base income shall be determined prior to any salary 
deductions or reductions for any salary deferral or 
pretax benefit programs authorized by federal law. 
(b) "Compensation" includes performance-based 
bonuses and cost-of-living adjustments. 
(c) "Compensation" does not include: 
(i) overtime; 
(ii) sick pay incentives; 
(iii) retirement pay incentives; 
(iv) the monetary value of 
remuneration paid in kind, such as a 
residence, use of equipment or 
uniform or travel allowances; 
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(v) a lump-sum payment or special 
payments covering accumulated leave; 
and 
(vi) all contributions made by an 
employer under this plan or under any 
other employee benefit plan 
maintained by an employer for the 
benefit of a participant. 
(d) "Compensation" for purposes of this chapter may 
not exceed the amount allowed under Internal 
Revenue Code Section 401 (a)(17). (emph. added) 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-103(3): 
"Full-time service" means 2,080 hours a year. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Adjudicative Hearing Officer of the Utah State 
Retirement Board, Judge James L. Barker, Jr., adopted by the Board on October 12,1995, denying 
Appellant's request that the Board be required to accept overtime ("GAP") time contributions for 
a four year period of time. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
On May 31,1995, O'Keefe, Board and Ogden City entered into a written stipulation of facts 
and appeared before the Adjudicative Hearing Officer of the Board, James L. Barker, Jr. Memoranda 
of Law were submitted by all parties subsequent to the hearing. The Adjudicative Hearing Officer 
then issued his decision in favor of the Board on October 12,1995. 
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III. Disposition By the Agency Below 
The Adjudicative Hearing Officer issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in support 
of the Board's interpretation of overtime, and against O'Keefe's claims that the Board interfered with 
his existing employment contract with Ogden City and his claims of equitable estoppel. O'Keefe 
appeals from these findings and conclusions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 31, 1995, O'Keefe, the Board, and Ogden City, Third Party Intervenor, agreed to 
a statement of facts and historical background which would "serve as the sole factual basis for the 
determination in this case." (R. 22). 
(1) O'Keefe and other peace officers similarly situated are public safety employees employed 
by Ogden City, and have been for the entire period of this controversy. 
(2) On July 1, 1985, Ogden City initiated a program whereby its peace officers, under certain 
prescribed and agreed upon circumstances, could be required to work more than 40 hours per week. 
(3) In 1989, as a result of negotiations held between Ogden City and its employees, including 
O'Keefe, an agreement was reached whereby any hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week but 
not more than 43 hours per week could be treated in either of two ways: 
a. The three (3) hours in question (commonly referred to as GAP time) could be 
taken later as leave, pursuant to which no compensation would be paid; or 
b. The GAP time could be treated as regular compensation (paid at regular - not 
overtime rates), pursuant to which the officer would receive additional compensation on which 
retirement contributions would be paid. 
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(4) The effect of the additional compensation and retirement contributions in the final three (3) 
years of O'Keefe's employment would result in an increase in the monthly retirement allowance of 
O'Keefe - estimated as follows: 
A. Assuming a May 1,1995 retirement date: 
If the URS accepts contributions on GAP time and the additional compensation is used in 
the calculation of the retirement allowance , the benefit would be $1,819.68. 
If the URS does not accept contributions on GAP time and the additional compensation is 
not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit would be $1,697.34. 
B. Assuming a July 1, 1995 retirement date: 
If the URS accepts contributions on GAP time and the additional compensation is used in 
the calculation of the retirement allowance, the benefit would be $1,842.48. 
If the URS does not accept contributions on GAP time and the additional compensation is 
not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit would be $1,717.80. 
Thus, O'Keefe's retirement allowance, if GAP time is determined to be eligible time worked 
under Utah laws, would increase anywhere between $122.34 - $124.68 per month. 
(5) In 1990, Ogden City began sending the first employer and employee contributions to the 
Retirement Systems for those employees who chose to treat the three (3) hour additional time (GAP) 
worked as "regular compensation." URS received and credited these contributions to the appropriate 
participating members' accounts, including O'Keefe. 
(6) In 1991, due to an administrative oversight, no contributions were sent by Ogden City. In 
1992, Ogden City forwarded the required contributions for both 1991 and 1992. 
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(7) Upon receipt of the 1992 contributions, URS determined that the GAP time contributions 
were ineligible and refunded the GAP time contributions to Ogden City for the appropriate years. 
(8) During the period from 1992 to the present, O'Keefe has taken the position that both the 
original 1990 contributions and subsequent contributions were eligible and should not have been 
refunded. URS has taken the position that the Office ruled the contributions ineligible as soon as 
it had actual knowledge of the GAP time issues. Actual knowledge did not occur until sometime in 
1992 when an employee sought to retire with GAP time included as part of compensation. 
(9) During this same period, officials from URS, Ogden City, O'Keefe, and others similarly 
situated met in an attempt to resolve the different interpretations of the law. During these 
discussions, the Retirement Office agreed to resume its acceptance of GAP time contributions 
conditionally while an additional study took place on the feasibility of developing a permanent 
policy covering GAP time contributions. O'Keefe believed a permanent policy had been adopted 
and the contributions were being accepted unconditionally. 
(10) Also during this time another employing unit, Weber County, requested GAP time coverage. 
All the parties then agreed that the Board's actuary, Wyatt and Associates, should determine any 
actuarial impact which would result from including GAP time in "compensation" for retirement 
purposes. 
(11) The actuary's assumptions and response was delivered in a letter to M. Dee Williams, 
Executive Director of URS, on June 2,1994: 
As explained to us, Ogden police officers have a 43-
hour work week. However, officers are allowed a 
choice between (i) taking direct pay for the three 
hours over 40, or (ii) taking this time as additional 
comp time. Most officers take the time as comp time, 
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but as they approach retirement, officers can and do 
switch to taking this as pay. By doing so, they 
increase their Average Annual Compensation, 
resulting in a higher retirement benefit. 
This policy increases the employer's contribution rate 
from 9.8% to 11.7%. Our calculation assumes that all 
members elect to maximize their retirement benefit -
i.e., they will be able to plan well enough in advance 
to increase their retirement benefits by 7.5% (the ratio 
of the 3 extra hours to the 40 hours they were being 
paid for earlier). 
(12) As a result of the actuary's findings and conclusions, URS resolved to permanently deny 
GAP time contributions. An additional reason for denial was forwarded - any administrative, i.e. 
URS decision to include GAP time would indeed be adding a benefit to the existing system at the 
cost determined by the actuary. Such an added benefit with a potential cost to all employers and 
employees, not just to Ogden City and its employees, should be decided by the Legislature, not URS. 
(13) O'Keefe has brought to URS' attention that a small number of Ogden public safety officers 
actually received a retirement allowance with GAP time included. The Retirement Office has agreed 
to honor those retirements. 
(14) There are twenty two (22) Ogden police officers left in this dispute. Ten (10) officers have 
elected to take their GAP time contribution refunds and are excluded from this dispute. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The essence of this controversy is whether a police officer who works more than forty (40) 
hours a week, but less than forty three (43) hours (called GAP time) may have compensation he 
earns from that GAP time included in the compensation used for calculating his retirement benefit, 
when the definition of compensation for retirement purposes specifically excludes compensation 
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earned from "overtime" work. The Board's position in this respect is that the Board is empowered 
to determine what is and what is not overtime. Its interpretation should be afforded great weight by 
the Court and is clearly reasonable under the circumstances. In no way did the Board's interpretation 
of overtime either interfere with O'Keefe's employment relationship with Ogden City or cause him 
to suffer injury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT! 
THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE STIPULATION OF FACTS AND SHOULD BE 
UPHELD BY THE COURT. 
O'Keefe argues that the facts clearly indicate that he did not know of the conditional nature 
of the Board's acceptance of contributions made on overtime worked. (Brief of Appellant P.20). 
However, the findings of fact clearly contradict this assertion. Stipulation No. 9 states: 
During this same period, officials from URS, Ogden 
City, Petitioner, and others similarly situated met in 
an attempt to resolve the different interpretations of 
the law. During these discussions the Retirement 
Office agreed to resume its acceptance of GAP time 
contributions conditionally while an additional study 
took place on the feasibility of developing a 
permanent policy covering GAP time contributions. 
Petitioner believed a permanent policy had been 
adopted and the contributions were being accepted 
unconditionally, (emph. added) 
O'Keefe conveniently omits his own involvement in these meetings in his citation of 
Stipulation No. 9 (Brief of Appellant P.20). The fact is O'Keefe was involved in the discussions 
over the interpretation of the law on GAP time and overtime. He was in the discussions where the 
Retirement Office agreed to resume its acceptance of GAP time contributions conditionally, and thus 
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he knew the conditional nature of the Board's acceptance of the contributions. It is not surprising 
then, that the Hearing Officer found that he may have "believed" that contributions were being 
accepted unconditionally, but he "knew" that the Board agreed to accept the contributions only 
conditionally, and he also knew that the Board had exercised its right under the conditional 
acceptance arrangement to deny the contributions prior to O'Keefe's retirement date. 
POINT II 
THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WITH RESPECT 
TO THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM "OVERTIME" ARE 
REASONABLE AND CONSISTENT WITH STATE AND FEDERAL LAW. 
A. The Board is statutorily empowered to define the term "overtime/' 
The Board, acting in its administrative capacity in interpreting a state statute, is entitled to 
have its interpretation afforded great weight, and should not be overturned unless clearly 
unreasonable. Anderson v. Public Service Comm'n of Utah. 839 P. 2d 822, 824 (Utah App. 1992), 
Oottfredson v. Utah State Retirement Poard, 808 P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1991). This is especially so 
where the agency has been granted discretion in defining a specific term. Morton Int'l. Inc. v. 
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991). Here the Board has 
been granted this degree of discretion. 
The power, authority and responsibility of the Board to administer each of the retirement 
systems under its care is clearly and unequivocally established pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-
203(1)(j), (g) and (1), where the Board is required to: 
(j) develop broad policy for the long-term operation 
of the various retirement systems, plans, and programs 
and j§ granted broad discretion and power to perform 
its policymaking functions; 
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(g) maintain, in conjunction with participating 
employers and members, the systems, plans, and 
programs on an actuarially sound or approved basis, 
subject to the responsibility of the Legislature to 
adjust benefits and contribution rates when 
recommended by the board; 
(1) regulate the duties of employing units and other 
public authorities which are imposed upon them by 
this title and specify the time, place, and manner in 
which contributions shall be withheld and paid, and 
obtain any reports necessary for the administration of 
this title, (emph. added) 
Yet, despite this clear and specific grant of authority, O'Keefe still insists that the Board has 
no statutory power to interpret the term "overtime." The Administrative Hearing Officer's 
conclusions of law in this respect are not only reasonable under the circumstances, they are the only 
conclusions he could have drawn. 
B. The Board's interpretation of the term "overtime" is reasonable and consistent with 
state and federal law. 
O'Keefe claims that there is no state definition of overtime and points to federal law, the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as controlling in matters of compensation. 
However, it is State law, Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-103(1), which establishes the definition of 
"compensation" for retirement purposes, but specifically excludes from compensation.. . . 
(l)(c)(i) "overtime . . ." While not specifically defining overtime, Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-103(3) 
defines what is full-time service: 
"Full-time service means 2,080 hours a year." 
It certainly appears logical and reasonable for the Board to conclude then that contributions 
made on compensation for hours worked in excess of 2,080 per year, or 40 hours per week, are 
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contributions for more than regular full-time work and therefore are contributions made on overtime 
compensation. Even O'Keefe accepts the Board's assertion that he has a regularly scheduled 40 hour 
tour of duty during a work period (R. 37). 
O'Keefe cites to both state and federal personnel law to justify a different interpretation of 
overtime. However, his claim that the Board must comply with these laws is simply erroneous. The 
FLSA and the State's overtime policies for state employees govern the employment relationship 
between an employer and its employees, not the relationship between the Board and members of the 
state-created retirement system administered by the Board pursuant to Title 49. 
Stated simply, there is no inconsistency with O'Keefe and Ogden City establishing what will 
be considered overtime for purposes of their relationship and the Legislature and the Board 
establishing a different and "uniform" requirement for overtime for all members participating in the 
Public Safety Retirement System. (See Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-102(1)). 
O'Keefe's final argument on this point would chastise the Board for its "restrictive" 
interpretation and for not liberally construing the statutes to provide maximum benefits. But he cites 
only half of the liberal construction statute. The complete statute reads: 
This title shall be liberally construed to provide maximum benefits 
and protections. Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-102(2). (emph. added) 
The maximum benefits O'Keefe seeks must be balanced with the maximum protections to 
the integrity and funding of the Public Safety Retirement System. He would have the Board pay 
retirement benefits on overtime compensation as long as the employer paid only regular salary rates 
for the overtime worked. In Stipulation No. 11, the actuary explained the actuarial and financial 
consequences of such an interpretation: 
12 
The actuary's assumptions and response was delivered in a letter to 
M. Dee Williams, Executive Director of URS, on June 2,1994: 
As explained to us, Ogden police officers have a 43-
hour work week. However, officers are allowed a 
choice between (i) taking direct pay for the three 
hours over 40, or (ii) taking this time as additional 
comp time. Most officers take the time as comp time, 
but as they approach retirement, officers can and do 
switch to taking this as pay. By doing so, they 
increase their Average Annual Compensation, 
resulting in a higher retirement benefit. 
This policy increases the employer's contribution rate 
from 9.8% to 11.7%. Our calculation assumes that all 
members elect to maximize their retirement benefit-
i.e., they will be able to plan well enough in advance 
to increase their retirement benefits by 7.5% (the ratio 
of the 3 extra hours to the 40 hours they were being 
paid for earlier). 
Indeed, taking O'Keefe's analysis to its logical conclusion, as long as regular pay rates are 
used, the compensation earned for retirement purposes would be unlimited. In the Board's 
judgment, such an interpretation would violate its fiduciary responsibility under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 49-1-203(1)(g) to: 
maintain, in conjunction with participating employers 
and members, the systems, plans, and programs on an 
actuarially sound or approved basis, subject to the 
responsibility of the Legislature to adjust benefits and 
contribution rates when recommended by the board. 
It could also unwillingly raise the contribution rates of all other participating employers and 
employees in the Public Safety Retirement System since the overtime interpretation must be applied 
uniformly to all members. 
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Rather than seek inappropriate relief through this Court, O'Keefe should petition the 
Legislature for a plan benefit change so overtime can be included in the definition of compensation, 
as it is for the retirement systems covering teachers and other public employees. 
POINT HI 
THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF OVERTIME DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH 
O'KEEFE'S EXISTING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, 
Contrary to O'Keefe's allegations, the Board did not "interfere" with negotiations between 
Ogden City and O'Keefe in the establishment of a policy concerning GAP time. As stated by the 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer, "no evidence exists on the record that the Board or its agents were in 
any way involved in the negotiation process" between O'Keefe and Ogden City. 
The provisions excluding overtime from compensation for retirement purposes were in state 
statute at the time of the negotiations. In any event, representatives from Ogden City deny the 
existence of employment contracts between O'Keefe and the City. The agreement which is 
evidenced in the Stipulation simply establishes a policy governing the compensation payable to 
O'Keefe if he works in excess of 40 but less than 43 hours per week. That part of the agreement is 
unaffected by the Board's interpretation of overtime. However, by agreeing to pay contributions on 
the overtime worked, the contributions became subject to the state statute governing compensation 
which may be used in calculating the retirement benefit. Since the Board determined that GAP time 
was overtime for retirement purposes, the contributions were made in error under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 49-1-603 and were properly refunded to O'Keefe. 
O'Keefe's arguments in this case bear a striking resemblance to those presented to and 
rejected by three different divisions of the Colorado Court of Appeals. 
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In the first case, Ager v. Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n Bd.. 1995 Colo. App. Lexis 
268, 19 BTR 1393 (Sept. 14, 1995 decided), one of the participating employers in the Colorado 
Retirement System, Colorado State University (CSU) entered into an "accelerated retirement 
agreement" with certain employees whereby CSU agreed to pay additional compensation in return 
for the employees' early retirement. CSU also agreed to pay retirement contributions on the 
additional compensation. However, Colorado Retirement System statutes provided that "bonuses 
for services not actually rendered, including but not limited to early retirement inducements" were 
not to be included in compensation for purposes of calculating retirement benefits. The Colorado 
Retirement Board denied the additional compensation under its interpretation of the statute and the 
employees appealed under the Colorado Administrative Procedures Act: 
"on the basis of an error of law. . . [and] an error of 
fact," that the Board's action was arbitrary and 
capricious, that the compensation plaintiffs had 
received pursuant to the Plan constituted salary for 
purposes of calculating retirement benefits payable by 
PERA, and that the Board was estopped from 
reducing plaintiff's retirement benefits. 
LI at 3. 
Yet the court in Ager found for the defendant board, stating that: 
The Board's authority to determine salary for PERA 
[retirement] purposes does not conflict with the 
university's authority to set the compensation for its 
faculty. . . . The university may set compensation 
for its faculty, but the Board must determine whether 
that compensation. . . meets the statutory definition 
of salary for PERA purposes. 
L L a t l l . 
See also Rumford v. Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n. 883 P. 2d 614, 616 (Colo. App. 
1994) and Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n v. Stermole. 874 P. 2d 444, 446 (Colo. App. 1993). 
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Similarly here, the Board's authority to determine compensation for retirement purposes does 
not conflict with Ogden City's authority to set compensation for its peace officers. The Board 
however, is entitled to determine whether certain compensation, i.e. overtime compensation, meets 
the statutory definition or exclusion. 
POINT IV 
O'KEEFE HAS NOT MET ANY OF THE REQUIREMENTS PRE-REQUISITE TO 
ASSERTING AN EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL ARGUMENT. 
Generally, estoppel is not assertable against the state and its agencies. See Eldredge v. Utah 
State Retirement Bd.. 795 P. 2d 671, 675 (Utah App. 1990) and Utah State Univ.. etc. v. Sutro & 
Co.. 646 P. 2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982). Even if it could be asserted in this case, O'Keefe must show 
the following: 
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one 
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) 
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken 
on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, 
act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party 
that would result from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, 
or failure to act. 
See Pdredge, supra. 
A. Statement 
The stipulated facts show that the Board did indeed agree to resume its acceptance of GAP 
time contributions, but did so "conditionally" pending additional study on the feasibility of 
developing a permanent policy governing GAP time. (Stipulation No. 9). Therefore, O'Keefe and 
all others similarly situated were on notice of the potential for the Board to move in a different 
direction with respect to acceptance of GAP time contributions. Under Stipulation No. 10, all 
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parties, including O'Keefe, agreed to an actuarial study to determine any actuarial impact. When 
the Board was informed of the negative actuarial and financial consequences, its decision to 
permanently deny GAP time contributions was not inconsistent with its earlier position. It was 
simply a foreseeable result of a study all parties were not only aware of, but approved. (See 
Stipulation No. 10). 
B. Reasonable Action 
O'Keefe has offered no evidence, either in the Stipulation or in his brief, that he took action 
or refrained from action in reliance upon the Board's acceptance of the contributions. In fact, he and 
others similarity situated continued to work, accrued service credit and subsequently controlled their 
own retirement destiny. The cases cited by O'Keefe to support equitable estoppel are distinguishable 
from his case. 
In Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd.. 795 P.2d 671 (Utah App. 1990), Eldredge relied 
on the representations of the Board and resigned a $37,000 a year position. In Celebrity Club. Inc. 
v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n. 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), the Club relied upon the representations 
of the commission and expended about $200,000. In Nevada Public Employees Retirement Bd. v. 
Byrne, 607 P. 2d 1351 (Nev. 1980), Byrne resigned a $23,000 per year position, sold his Las Vegas 
home and purchased a retirement home in California. 
Contrast these acts to those of O'Keefe, who contributed money on the GAP time but who 
has already received a refund of those ineligible contributions. He now claims in his argument that 
based upon a projected retirement benefit, he made decisions concerning retirement. Nowhere does 
the record contain any evidence of his reliance on any projected benefit, or any evidence that he 
retired in reliance on such representations. To the contrary, he knew long before his effective 
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retirement date that the Board would deny contributions on overtime compensation. O'Keefe simply 
did not act to his own detriment. 
C. Injury 
Finally, O'Keefe must prove he was injured by the Board's decision to ultimately deny GAP 
time contributions. Once again the Plaintiffs, in the cases cited by O'Keefe, (Eldredge. Celebrity 
Club and Byrne), were injured in a specified and certified amount. In O'Keefe's case it was 
stipulated that, dependent on O'Keefe's projected retirement date, he could receive between $122.34 
- $124.68 less per month, based on the board's interpretation excluding overtime. O'Keefe might 
indeed receive more than that amount if he continues to work. In any event, he knew prior to 
retirement of the possibility that overtime would be excluded and had abundant time to adjust his 
own retirement plans. 
The situations which more closely parallel O'Keefe's situation are found in Holland v. Career 
Services Review Bd.. 856 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1993), Andergpn v. ?V\)YK Service CQmm'n pf Utah, 
839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), and Williams v. Public Service Comm'n of Utah. 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 
1988). 
In Anderson, the Public Service Commission revoked Anderson's certificate of convenience 
and necessity as a common carrier. Anderson argued that certain representations were made during 
negotiations that should estop the Commission from revoking his certificate. The court held 
Anderson's estoppel claim fails because it does not meet the high standard of proof required for 
estoppel against the government. Anderson at 827. Citing the Celebrity Club and Eldredge 
decisions, the court distinguished these cases because they "involved very specific written 
representations by authorized government entities." M* 
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The Holland decision applied the same rational in refusing to apply estoppel in a case 
involving a state employee's eligibility for automatic reappointment to a position within the State 
Office of Education. 
In O'Keefe's case the stipulation clearly establishes the GAP time contributions would only 
be honored pending further study on the issues. This hardly meets the standard of the specific 
written representation favored by the court. 
O'Keefe simply has failed to show the standards required to invoke estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
While the Board is committed to maximizing retirees' benefits to the extent permitted by law, 
it is equally committed to administering the systems in a uniform manner consistent with the 
underlying actuarial assumptions governing the systems. To do otherwise would both violate the 
financial integrity of one of the few retirement systems in the U.S.A. that remain funded on an 
actuarial sound basis and blur the distinction between the Legislature's right to decide the benefit 
structure for public employees and the Board's fiduciary duty to protect and maximize the benefits 
thus granted. O'Keefe should simply ask the Legislature to change the definition of compensation 
to allow for this increase in benefit. 
Also, it is appropriate to comment on what is becoming a disturbing trend in the public 
pension community and is evident in this and the Colorado cases. Under the guise of maximizing 
benefits, an employee may seek to increase the compensation received in the final few years 
preceding retirement for the purpose of enhancing the retirement benefit (which is usually calculated 
on the basis of the final three (3) to five (5) years of compensation earned in a career). The problem 
with this strategy is that it undermines the actuarial assumptions upon which the retirement systems 
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are funded, in paniculai UP. .^suiiipiinii iinii ilic employee will receive compensation increases 
•
j
 * areer and will pay contributions on those increases over his career. 
i> ahli to vt\«»id paying these contributions during d = -:, but Uicn payj them -_r.') 
during t: . . • .v "in i'm ir*\ years, ihe System is short-changed and all remaining members 
~vl -vees are left to pick up v\e dadiiu.nai costs. 
I'iit Administrative : ^ann •:.. - < of Fact and Conclusions of Law are soi incl, 
ba^ c 'vidence contained in the Stipulation of Facts and are reasonable under the 
circumstaiiL*^ r- :> ird respectfully requests thai this I ml ,iHirru iiitj I inclines of Fact, 
Conclusions oi Law and iuii.,oimn"inU"1 i Kin I»I the Adjudicative Hearing Officer. 
DATED this 13th day of March, 1W6, IC^ j^4^^ ^ 
KEVIN A. HOWARD 
Attorney for Appellee 
CERTIFICA" 5 -— ML, 
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n tailing, by first class mail wiin '.iiiiiciiiii po1 u\py pre-paid to the following address; 
Brian R, Florence 
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818-26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
KEVIN A. HOWARD 
Attorney for Appellee 
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560 East 200 South, Suite 230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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Attorney for Ogden City 
2484 Washington Blvd., #320 
Ogden, Utah 84401-2319 
(801) 629-8145 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
JOSEPH W. O'KEEFE, JR., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Respondent. 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT 
BY PETITIONER AND 
RESPONDENT 
Joseph W. O'Keefe, Jr, Petitioner, the Utah State Retirement Board, Respondent, and Ogd^  
City, Third Party Intervenor, pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code 
§63-46b-9, by and through counsel hereby stipulate and agree to the following background and facts: 
RArKOROIIND 
This case arises out of a disagreement between Joe O'Keefe, Petitioner, and others similarly 
situated, who are police officers employed by Ogden City and the Utah Retirement Systems 
("URS"), over the refusal of URS to accept retirement contributions on "GAP" time - i.e. a three 
1 
[KEVINVGAPl.MTNl 
(3) hour period worked by Petitioner over mal dhovi; ilie teguhii 'I1'1!"" f caod. Tho
 W L 
position is c worked is "overtime" and is excluded from coverage undc- TT*~U 
law. The Petitioner's position is that this time should be treated as regula 
ordered to accept the contributions p, *4 include "GAP" time in the final average 
salary rnmpnnent used to calculate Petitioner's retirement allowance. Both, sides agree ttidi i) MM 
decision,, of the Hearing Officer is in,, favor of Petitionee i' t1 dcusio' * H h applied both 
prospectively and retroai ontributions paid on behalf of Petitioner and others 
similarly • situated since 1990. 
The following Stipulation of Facte ts miciiJi J Tr-v 1 ilir sole factual basis for the 
determinat. - - "company ing memoranda of law will be supplied in accordance with 
the schedule established by the Hearing Officer, 
STU'LlLATIur J Of FACTS 
1. >'Keefe and other peace officers similarlv situated are pubiti ijatety 
employees employed by Ogden City, and have been loi (he tiMw f N • iu<l l il is c "nir'vn i v 
2 . . *• iam whereby its peace officers, under certain 
prescribed, and agreed upon circumstances, could be required to work more tha -;* - -.. ^ . . •. ; 
3. " In 1989, as a result of negotiations held heiwen i)ytlni irloyees, including 
jgieeiTieiii w.is rp.ir hed whereby any hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week but 
not more 'than 45 lours per week could be treated in either of two ways: 
a.) The three m (commonI v referred to as "GAP1" tune) could, be 'taken 
later as leave, pursuant to which no compensation would be paid; or 
fa.) The "GAP" time could be treated, as regulai uiinpuiSiHion lp.*nl *i regular - not 
overtime rates), pursuant to which the officer would receive additional compensation on 
which retirement contributions would be paid. 
4» The effect of the additional compensation and retirement contributions in the final three (3) 
years of Petitioner's employment would result in an increase in the monthly retirement allowance 
of Petitioner - estimated as follows: 
fa Assuming a May 1,1995 retirement date: 
If the URS accepts contributions on GAP time and the additional 
compensation is used in the calculation of the retirement allowance , the benefit 
would be $1,819.68. 
If the URS does not accept contributions on GAP time and the additional 
compensation is not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit 
would be $1,697.34. 
B. Assuming a July 1,1995 retirement date: 
If the URS accepts contributions on GAP time and the additional 
compensation is used in the calculation of the retirement allowance , the benefit 
would be $1,842.48. 
If the URS does not accept contributions on GAP time and the additional 
compensation is not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit 
would be $1,717.80. 
Thus, Petitioner's retirement allowance, if GAP time is determined to be eligible time 
worked under Utah laws, would increase anywhere between $122.34 - $124.68 per month. 
5. In 1990, Ogden City began sending the first employer and employee contributions to the 
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retirement systems few those »• npl" i'w^ ^h" m^v *i» treat the 3 hour additional time (GAP) worked,. 
ti. "regular compensation." URS received and credited these contributions to the appropriate 
participating members' accounts, including Petitionei 
6. I: , itive oversight, no contributions were sent by Ogden City, In 
1992, Ogden City forwarded the required contributions for both 1991 and . 
7. Upon receipt of tfte •* :. S determined that the GAP ame contributions 
¥ en ire Mndeu the oA? lime contributions to Ogden City for the appropriate years. 
8. ,' During the period from 1992 to the present, Peiitioiici hu.< mki ii ilu prism, i Hi n hoth the 
crig:nr?f • contributions ai • 'itributions were eligible and should not have' been 
v ' IJRS has taken the position that the jfrize ruled the contributions Ineligible as soon as it 
had actual knowledge of the GAP time issues ALIIJJI Miuw(-"ii?t riM ii'»l M cur until|pn employee 
sought to retire vvh "! \\'} (inn, eluded as part of compensation. 
9. ! During this same period, officials from URS, Ogden City, Petitioner, and others similarly 
situated, met in, an, attempt to resolve tli Mrttrrnii iiiiripnirthuns of the law During these 
discussions the i etirenieiit office agreed to resume its acceptance of Gap time contributions^while ' 
A J additional study took place on the feasibility of developing a p^rm *. » 
contributions. V*€T\TIOIE^ W ^ ^ B o ^ ( j ^ ^ A u g w r f^ l\^ -% * ;~* ^ AOo^reO 
- -1 during this time another employing unit, Weber (* >*.r % requested ^ap time .. iv -.: u •. 
All the parties then agreed that the board s actual1 v. \ ouia determine any 
actuarial impuu wiiii.h wuuiii ICMIII Horn including GAP time in "compensation" for retirement 
purposes. 
11 The actuary's assumptions and, respor, i a letter to M. Dee Williams, 
Executive Director of URS, on June 2, 1994: 
"As explained to us, Ogden police officers have a 43-hour work week. 
However, officers are allowed a choice between (i) taking direct pay for the three 
hours over 40, or (ii) taking this time as additional comp time. Most officers take the 
time as comp time, but as they approach retirement, officers can and do switch to 
taking this as pay. By doing so, they increase their Average Annual Compensation, 
resulting in a higher retirement benefit. 
This policy increases the employer's contribution rate from 9.8% to 11.7%. 
Our calculation assumes that all members elect to maximize their retirement benefit -
i.e., they will be able to plan well enough in advance to increase their retirement 
benefits by 7.5% (the ratio of the 3 extra hours to the 40 hours they were being paid 
for earlier)." 
12. As a result of the actuary's findings and conclusions, URS resolved to permanently deny 
GAP time contributions. An additional reason for denial was forwarded - any administrative, i.e. 
URS decision to include GAP time would indeed be adding a benefit to the existing system at the 
cost determined by the actuary. Such an added benefit with a potential cost to all employers and 
employees, not just to Ogden City and its employees, should be decided by the Legislature, not URS. 
13. Petitioner has brought to URS' attention that a small number of Ogden Public Safety officers 
actually received a retirement allowance with Gap time included. The retirement office has agreed 
to honor those retirements. 
14. These are twenty two (22) Ogden police officers left in this dispute. Ten (10) officers have 
elected to take their Gap time contribution refunds and are excluded from this dispute. 
5 
These facts constitute the entire background and facts upon whicn reuuoi 
seek an adjudication. All parties &i\ ijiiqiuiii J, iii 1 (h'w.' to submit memoranda of law in support: of 
ihi i! riA.pi'n li\ i iru.sitions, mcluding Ogden City, which will be in accordance with, the following 
schedule: 
Petitioner's l\iv:\ \ f" iii11. •; ii'ini HI tiling of the Stipulation of Facts with the Hearing 
Officer. 
Respondent's 3n>f 30 days from '' <f. 
"
 v
 : M - 30 da>s from the recent ' ' Trie *. 
Petitioner- k ^ p - K 0 days f^ir rhc we**i _^pon I'll ml P »rt\ 
Intervenorfs Briefs, whichever is hiiM 
Agreed in i"i',^  j j i _ day of March, 1995. 
/ 
J^X^JSLf^^—*•• T- ; ivdU « J^L 
Brian Florence A Howar 
Attorney for Petitioner * t or • v^ »or Respondent 
'£«ddh?< }*u>o^ 
Buck Froerer 
Attorney for Ogden City 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
JOSEPH W. O'KEEFE, JR., 
Petitioner, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER TO DISMISS 
vs. 
i 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, : 
Respondent-
Based upon the evidence received at the evidentiary hearing in this matter and the legal 
memoranda submitted by both parties, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer makes the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order: 
HNDINGSOFFACT 
1. Petitioner, Joe O'Keefe and other peace officers similarly situated are public safety 
employees employed by Ogden City, and have been for the entire period of this controversy. 
2. On July 1, 1985, Ogden City initiated a program whereby its peace officers, under 
certain prescribed and agreed upon circumstances, could be required to work more than 40 hours per 
week. 
1 [Kevin/Okeefe.ord] 
i •>*-: ; :hy-«2. ,.» .», -v... mioyees, 
including Petitioner, .1. *d whereby any hours worked in excess of 40 hours per 
week but not more than 43 hours per week could be treated in either of two ways: 
A. The three (3) hours in quc5 monly referred to as "Gap" time) could 
be taken iiiif 1 us ltMvc, pursuant to which no compensation would be paid; or 
B. The "Gap" time could be treated as regular compeuu f regular -
not overtime rates), pursue 1 p' * whi' !• k" • ^Cii'e? would receive additional compensation,, on 
trement contributions would be paid. 
4. The effect of the additional compensation and retiiii mail cimtt notions in the final 
three (3) years 01 mould result in an increase in the monthly retirement 
e of Petitioner - estimated as follows: 
\ssumingaMay 1, ivvs, letiremnii ™i!,», 111 'r 1 
II li l!KHii riaepts contributions . " 1 f *u~ additional 
compensation, is used in the calculation,, of 'he ret-.iemem <t* fit 
would be $1,£. 3. 
If tl ic URS does QQI accept contributions on "Gap" time and the additional 
compensation is not used in, the ca^u^i. . mc oenetit 
would ix? I'll/i'1' , 4 
B. . . .unira* t ^ - * 19Q5. retirement date' 
If the (JRt "Gap" time and the additional 
compc ased a\ iac calculation of the retirement allowance, the bene lit 
would be $1,842.48. 
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If the URS does not accept contributions on "Gap" time and the additional 
compensation is not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit 
would be $1,717.80. 
Thus, Petitioner's retirement allowance, if "Gap" time is determined to be eligible time 
worked under Utah laws, would increase anywhere between $122.34 - $124.68 per month. 
5. In 1990, Ogden City began sending the first employer and employee contributions 
to the retirement systems for those employees who chose to treat the 3 hour additional time ("Gap") 
worked as "regular compensation." URS received and credited these contributions to the appropriate 
participating members' accounts, including Petitioner. 
6* In 1991, due to an administrative oversight, no contributions were sent by Ogden 
City. In 1992, Ogden City forwarded the required contributions for both 1991 and 1992. 
7. Upon receipt of the 1992 contributions, URS determined that the "Gap" time 
contributions were ineligible and refunded the "Gap" time contributions to Ogden City for the 
appropriate years. 
8. During the period from 1992 to the present, Petitioner has taken the position that both 
the original 1990 contributions and subsequent contributions were eligible and should not have been 
refunded. URS has taken the position that the Retirement Office ruled the contributions ineligible 
as soon as it had actual knowledge of the "Gap" time issues. Actual knowledge did not occur until 
some time in 1992 when an employee sought to retire with "Gap" time included as part of 
compensation. 
9. During this same period, officials from URS, Ogden City, Petitioner, and others 
similarly situated met in an attempt to resolve the different interpretations of the law. During these 
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discussions the Retirement Iffk :- agreed u* ~esume its acceptance of "Gap"' time contributions 
conditionally while an -,.. ~ i) of developing a permanent 
po I i r v <' f >verin c, '* Gapn time contributions. Petitioner believed a permanent policy had been adopted 
and the contributions were being accepted unconditionally. 
10* A employing unit, Weber County, requested "Gap" time 
coverage. All the parties 'then agreed that the Board's actuary, Wyatt and Associates, should 
determine any actuarial impact which wuunl ICMHI hum im u Inh> '* i.tn' inm m ""compensation" 
for retirement
 t 
11. The actuary's assumptions and response was delivered in a letier 10 M, Dee U " iKoni y*, 
Executive Director of ; .S. on .1 it i ."!, I""«'"'M 
.-lb explained to us, Osden . . * officers have a 43-hour work week. 
However, officers are allowed a * ee:i (I) taking direct pay for the three 
hours over 40, or (ii) taking this time as additional comp time. Most officers take the 
time as comp time, but as they approach retirement, officers can and do switch to 
taking this as pay. By doing so, they increase their Average Annual Compensation, 
resulting in a higher retirement benefit. 
'This policy increases the employer's contribution rate from 9.8% to 11.7%. 
Our calculation assumes that all members elect to maximize their retirement benefit -
i.e., they will be able to plan well enough in advance to increase their retirement 
benefits by 7.5% (the ratio of the 3 extra hours to the 40 hours they were being paid 
for earlier). 
As a result of the actuary's findings and conciiiM')!'1 • VK* IMMI|VHI| in pninanently 
d^nv " . u„ lujntnhntiDiir-. ,\n additional reason for denial was forwarded - any administrative, 
i.e. URS decision to include "Gap" time would indeed be adding a benefit iu the existing sysit'm at 
'the cost determined by 'the actuary, Suc.lt tin added Liir!i( w nt i riotential cost to all employers and 
iiipluvcf^ not T,f to Ogden City and its employees, should be decided by the legislature, not URS. 
13. Petitioner has brought to URS' attention that a small number of Ogden Public Safety 
officers actually received a retirement allowance with "Gap" time included. The Retirement Office 
has agreed to honor those retirements. 
14. There are twenty two (22) Ogden police officers left in this dispute. Ten (10) officers 
have elected to take their "Gap" time contribution refunds and are excluded from this dispute. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner's appeal for inclusion of "Gap" time as compensation for retirement purposes and 
for the Board to accept contributions thereon is based on a number of theories — each of them will 
be discussed herein. 
1. Petitioner seeks a determination that federal law be used to define "overtime." 
Petitioner is certainly correct that "overtime compensation" is subject to federal law. The stipulated 
facts (No. 3) show that Petitioner and his employer, Ogden City, were aware of federal requirements 
when negotiating the treatment of "Gap" time. However, just because federal law is applicable to 
the treatment of "Gap" time between Petitioner and his employer does not mean that federal law 
governs the operation of Utah's statutory retirement systems. In fact, public pension plans are 
specifically exempt from the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") which 
controls pension activities in general. Petitioner has not demonstrated that federal law controls. The 
legislature is still free to establish what compensation is includable for retirement purposes. 
The more persuasive argument is that state law controls. Under state retirement statutes, 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-103(1) (c)(1) specifically excludes overtime. No definition of overtime 
appears under Title 49. However, Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-103(3) does provide that "full-time 
service means 2,080 hours per year." Petitioner claims that should only be interpreted to establish 
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a minimum requirement for membership. However, the definition,, nsdt carries i.« i M. I. I i i J 
application. unreasonable, especially when coupled 
with the actuary's conclusion that the adoption of Petitioners position would result in a substantial 
increase both in benefits and in contribution rates for employer. unlhw I'mployees. Tins ..IPIKMI '„, i 
be wiin. in conjunction with participating employers and 
members, the systems, plans and programs on an actuarially sound or approved basis, , I, »i 
Code Ann, § 49-1-203. 
Therefore, this court concludes that state law, not federal law applies to this matter. 
2. Petitioner's second major contention is that the Boai d's interpretai 
unreasonably interfered WL veen Petitioner and his employer 
a» '(I renrinH the member's right to contract for ; r^i -i N-*. t *. idence exists on the record that the 
Board or its agents were in any way involved in the negotiation pii n ess *>emi\T «i f tj 1t11n >• i'•• • • i • ti 1i,s 
employer. In I« i'»l iln -ilaluii's i iwerniiiy, ^Dispensation were in existence in 1989 at the time of 
these negotiations. Petitioner and his employer should have known, this. The brief submitted by 
Ogden City appears to support; the Board's position in this -
I herefore, this court concludes that the Board did not interfere with any contract, right of 
Petitioner. 
. 3 . 1 lie Itail .jiLfiijiiirni Ini 'wjjduJ bv hiiiioiiri is based on the doctrine of estoppel That 
is Petitioner properly states requires (Da statement, admission, act o:r failure to act by one 
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (21 reasonable jcm i i iniinii i In ilir ndim pirtv 
taken on the basis i .1 Hi I'u si | vi i, • suicn .rnt, admission, act, or failure to act, md (?) injury to the 
second party that would result, from allowing the act, or failure to act. 
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Petitioner has not met his burden of proof for applying the doctrine. The stipulation states 
that he reasonably believed that a permanent policy had been adopted and that contributions were 
being accepted unconditionally. But, the stipulation also states that he was aware that the Board 
agreed to resume its acceptance of "Gap" time contributions only conditionally, and that on June 2, 
1994, prior to retiring, that the actuary had recommended raising the employer's contribution rate, 
and that the Board had resolved to deny the "Gap" contributions. Therefore, this court concludes 
Petitioner has not met the elements required to invoke the doctrine of estoppel. 
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
Petitioner's request that the Board be required to accept "Gap" time contributions during the 
last four years is denied. 
Dated this JdL day of October, 1995. 
r~Jr. ^ ^ James L. Barker 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Denial of the Adjudicative 
Hearing Officer is hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board. 
DATED this /£ day of October, 1995. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
fTV&te-n^ 
